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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The EC Anti-Personnel Landmine Regulation of 2001 mandated evaluation of EC Mine
Action strategy every three years. The first report was a Global Evaluation published in 2005,
this report forms one part of the 2008 evaluation by regions and covers South East Europe,
2002-2007.
The approach used for the evaluation was desk research visits to two mine-affected countries
(Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia) and further contact with EC Delegations by phone and
internet. Face-to-face discussions with RELEX and EuropeAid staff in Brussels were only
possible after the country visits.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The selection of countries to receive funding was appropriate and relevant. The allocation of
funding was also generally relevant.
The transition from the old to the new Instruments has not been especially smooth, creating
some uncertainty within Delegations. EC funding that once seemed reasonably certain
suddenly ‘disappeared’, leaving those expecting its continuation disappointed.
Communication between EC Delegation staff (working in isolation on mine action issues)
throughout South East Europe should be strengthened.
There are some problems with fragmentation and isolation of the EC mine action efforts and
the staff responsible for implementing them. These were noted in the 2005 Global report but
have been exacerbated in some ways by deconcentration, the ending of the anti-personnel
landmine horizontal budget line and other impacts of the new Instruments.
Much of this could be overcome by:
•

Reinstating a clear and effective focal point in Brussels.

•

Creating a mine action strategy that reflects the change in Instrument.

•

Bringing the Country Strategy Plans up to date.

•

Creating a budget mechanism to permit funding of regional or worldwide actions that
are outside the responsibility of Delegations.

The very recent publication of two EC-funded guidance documents will go a long way to
remedying these concerns if certain aspects of the documents are properly implemented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted a Regulation1 in two
parts as the basis of the European Community response to the problem of Anti-Personnel
Landmines (APL). The Regulation laid the foundation of a Europe-wide integrated and
focused policy.
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the European Commission (EC) Regulation states:
“The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community
in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved
and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations”.
The APL Regulation goes on to state: “Every three years after entry into force of
this Regulation, the commission shall submit to the European Parliament an
overall assessment of all Community mine actions […]” (Article 14).
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-20072 further
specified that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing
the results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.
To implement these provisions, the EC:
•

Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period
2002-2004;

•

Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to
identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following
regions:
Africa
Asia-Pacific

Caucasus-Central Asia
Europe

Latin America
Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 20053 while the agreement with
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.
The objective of the Global Assessment is to determine to what extent the objectives and
means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy,
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement
the Global Assessment by focusing on:
•
•

relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment;
EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country and regional levels.

Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming
1

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action
against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC)
1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel
landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p 6). The provisions are nearly
identical. The two regulations are collectively known as “The APL regulation”.
2
This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the
first covered the period 2002-04.
3
Gasser, Russell and Keeley, Robert, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
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issues.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in South East
Europe to generate credible and useful lessons for the EC, to support the improved planning
and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.
For more detail see the TOR at Annex 1.
The evaluation entailed:
•
•
•
•
•
•

preliminary planning and research;
initial contact with EC staff in Brussels;
missions to the focus countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia);
additional contact with EC delegation staff in one further country (Cyprus);
meetings in Brussels with EC staff to discuss the initial findings;
analysis and reporting.

The Evaluation Team comprised Alistair Craib, Director of Baric (Consultants) Ltd and Sean
Moorhouse, an independent consultant. Both have considerable experience of mine action.
The country missions were organised as follows:
Table 1 – Country missions
Country
BiH
Croatia

Timing
17 - 23 August 2008
23 - 30 August 2008

Team Members
Alistair Craib
Sean Moorhouse

Reporting included a country report on each of the two countries visited, and this overall
strategic evaluation report.

THE DEFINITION OF SOUTH EAST EUROPE
There was some discussion whether the report should cover all Europe but it was agreed that
this was unnecessary and the report should cover only South East Europe. However, it is
worth making clear what countries are covered here since, arguably, there is some confusion
over what constitutes South East Europe. There were two over-arching documents seen by
the Study Team.
Firstly, the ‘Western Balkans Regional Strategy Paper. 2002-2006’. The countries shown in
the European list are:
Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia.
Secondly, ‘The EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007’. Here the countries are:
Albania, Belarus, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia/Chechnya,
Serbia, and Ukraine.
From the first list only Bulgaria and Romania are not shown in the second and are therefore
no longer considered. The TOR for this study specifically mentions Cyprus, which is on
neither list. Only the Turkish part of Cyprus attracts EC funding for mine action and as
Turkey is a pre-accession country for European Union (EU) membership, Cyprus is included
on that basis.
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The list of countries considered in this report is in Table 2.

DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION CRITERIA
The standard development evaluation criteria promoted by the Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of Relevance, Effectiveness Efficiency, Impact and
Sustainability will be used in this evaluation, in line with the Terms of Reference (ToR). For
the purpose of this report these are defined as:
•

Relevance: The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies
of the target group, recipient and donor.

•

Effectiveness: A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

•

Efficiency: An economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly
resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.

•

Impact: The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention,
directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

•

Sustainability: Whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor
funding has been withdrawn. This includes environmental as well as financial
sustainability.
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2. GENERAL FINDINGS
SIZE OF THE PROBLEM
Europe suffered two world wars in the last century which impacted on all but very few
countries on the continent and on many outside it. From the end of the Second World War
until the collapse of the Soviet Union, very large areas of land were used for military training,
equipment development and testing, and stockpiling of munitions. This has left an enormous
legacy of land contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW) – some going back to the
First World War – and, in some countries, vast stockpiles of munitions which will now never
be used and need to be destroyed.
Despite its relative wealth and high technology base Western Europe is still contaminated 90
years after the First World War and 63 since the Second World War. Casualties are very rare
and there is extremely limited impact on any form of development or economic activity.
Some countries, such as Germany, actively seek large air-drop bombs but others, such as the
United Kingdom (UK), do not and simply wait until they are found (usually by construction
contractors). The Netherlands requires an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) check prior to
intrusive construction work to ensure that the site is clear of unexploded bombs or other
ERW. There is a body of opinion which, as a consequence of this situation, believes that if
the same level of clearance can be achieved in other European countries – including those
listed in the table below – then success is achieved. It was stated in Kosovo in 2000 that the
aim of the large scale clearance at that time was to reduce contamination to the level of
Western Europe. At least one international NGO is trying to have that position changed but it
was widely accepted by donor countries in 2001 as the correct position.
South East Europe has 11 countries with current mine and/or other ERW problems. The
countries reviewed in this report are indicated in the table below.

Extension
request
made?

1 Aug 10
N/A (none
declared)

Likelihood
of meeting

1 Mar 04

Deadline
for Article 4

1 Aug 00

Belarus

Likelihood
of meeting

Deadline
for Article 5

Albania

Mined area
left (km2)

Country

State Party
Since

Table 2 – The mine action situation in South East Europe

1.6

High

1 Aug 04

Met

No

N/A

N/A

1 Mar 08

Missed

BiH

1 Mar 99

1 Mar 09

1,573

Low

1 Mar 03

Met

Croatia

1 Mar 99

1 Mar 09

997

Low

1 Mar 03

Met

Cyprus
Kosova
Macedonia
Montenegro
Russia/Chechnya
Serbia
Ukraine

1 Jul 03
No
1 Mar 99
1 Apr 07
No4
1 Mar 04
1 Jun 06

1 Jul 13
N/A
1 Mar 09
1 Apr 17
N/A
1 Mar 14
1 Jun 16

2.75
N/A
0.39
60+
3.5
N/K

High
N/A
Completed
High
N/A
High
High

1 Jul 07
N/A
1 Mar 03
1 Apr 11
N/A
1 Mar 08
1 Jun 10

Met
N/A
Met
Met
N/A
Met
Low

No
Yes
(1 Mar
19)
Yes
(1 Mar
19)
No
No
No
No
N/A
No
No

ALBANIA
Albania has two main explosive threats. The northeast is contaminated by mines and ERW
arising largely from the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, when forces of the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) laid extensive minefields in the border districts. In addition to
4

Still using landmines (Landmine Monitor 2007, page 1042).
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anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, the area contains unexploded sub-munitions and other
unexploded ordnance (UXO) resulting from FRY artillery, and at least six NATO cluster
strikes which fell within Albanian territory.
A general survey by the Albanian Armed Forces in 1999-2000 identified 102 affected border
areas totalling some 15 km2. The international NGO (DanChurchAid) identified five new
hazardous areas in 2006 but, by the end of the year, estimated that just over 2 km2 of
contamination remained. This was one-third less than the end-2005 estimate of over 3 km2.
Central Albania is also believed to be contaminated by mines and ERW resulting from
widespread looting of military depots in 1997. Albania had identified 15 hotspots of
contamination with abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) covering some 2.2 square
kilometres. In April 2004 it reported these had been cleared but, in 2005, 16 ERW incidents
caused 21 casualties. In April 2006, six magazines exploded in military storage tunnels in the
southern Albanian village of Dhemblaj, scattering shells to other villages as far as five
kilometres away.
There have been no mine victims in the north-east for several years but mine contamination
has hampered development of infrastructure in this isolated, mountainous and impoverished
area. The contamination has blocked access to land and water resources needed by a
population that is mostly dependent on subsistence farming and animal husbandry.
Under the previous Multi-Annual Strategy and Programming, the EC supported mine
clearance and technical survey of the mined areas of Albania, especially in the north-east. A
large number of mines needed to be cleared. The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) indicate
that these hindered the development of the country. It was expected that the EC funding, from
the thematic budget line, would help Albania meet its anti-personnel mine ban convention
(APMBC)5 obligation within ten years.
Since 1999 14.7 km2 has been released by various forms of survey and by clearance. At
present 1.6 km2 remains outstanding after which Albania will achieve Article 5 compliance.6
The policy and procedures used in Albania have been developed by the Albanian Mine Action
Executive (AMAE) almost entirely without external assistance.
BELARUS
Belarus has 4.5M stockpiled landmines of which 3.6M are PFM-1 and PFM-1S mines. Under
the previous Multi-Annual Strategy and Programming, the EC pledged to support PFM-1
destruction upon identification of an appropriate technology and on progress towards
acceding to the APMBC. A competitive tender was issued but the project was then cancelled
in December 2006 after an evaluation committee concluded that a technically compliant
bidder could not be identified (there are suggestions that the tendering process itself was
flawed). The funds were therefore ‘decommitted’ and the process to secure new EC funds will
need to begin all over again. The collapse of this project will likely result in Belarus not being
able to fulfill its obligations under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy all stockpiled
antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.
No EC-funded mine action intervention has taken place in Belarus despite discussions since
2005. EUR 4M has been earmarked to assist with the destruction of Belarus’s stockpile of
PFM-1 antipersonnel mines and discussions are presently taking place to agree ToR and a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The funding must be committed by the end of this
5
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction.
6
To clear all known mined areas.
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year (2008). Since the project has yet to start, there is nothing to evaluate.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The origins of BiH’s mine and ERW contamination lie in the wars resulting from the breakup of the FRY in 1992-1995. All sides in the conflict used mines. The nature of the fighting,
in which confrontation lines and alliances were fluid, resulted in widespread contamination of
the country.
Most of the minefields remaining today are in the zone of separation between the two entities.
This is approximately 1,100 kilometres in length and up to four kilometres wide. In the north,
the fertile agricultural belt in Brčko District is one of the most heavily contaminated areas.
Mines are denying farmers access to this formerly productive land.
Professional military units mapped the minefields they laid. However, the numerous militias
laid mines with few or no records. This is especially the case in central and southern BiH.
In its 2009-2019 strategy, the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) states that it assumes that
1,573 km2 of land will remain contaminated by mines and UXO at the beginning of 2009.
CROATIA
Anti-personnel mines (and other mines) were emplaced in Croatia’s territory during the
conflict that took place between 1991 and 1995. During these four years, mines were laid by
all warring parties along lines of confrontation, which changed frequently. Mines were also
laid in areas of strategic importance, including railway lines, power stations, pipelines and
military installations.
The use of anti-personnel mines, added to the general consequences of war which resulted in
significant numbers of other ERW, left Croatia severely contaminated. This contamination
was located in 14 of Croatia’s 21 counties. Large agricultural areas, parts of infrastructure
facilities, forest areas and riverbanks were made, and remain inaccessible due to known, or
suspected, emplacement of mines and the presence of ERW. During the period between
March 1996 and June 1998 the United Nations Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) office in
Croatia played a leading role in collecting data on contaminated areas. UNMAC assessments
resulted in an estimate that approximately 13,000 km2 of Croatian territory was suspected to
contain mines7. This was later considered to be a gross overestimation of the actual amount
of potentially dangerous areas.
Following the creation of the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in late 1999 it was
able to reduce the original UNMAC estimate to 5,980 km2. This included the total area
represented by 11,228 minefield records obtained by CROMAC. This was further reduced to
4,000 km2 in 2001 and then to 1,700 km2 by the beginning of 2002. This has been further
reduced to 997 km2 and all suspect land is now comprehensively marked with 14,500 mine
warning signs.
CYPRUS
During the conflict in Cyprus both parties laid defensive minefields. Following a de facto
cease-fire, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) inspected the deployment of the Cyprus
National Guard and the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot forces and a buffer zone was established.
The defensive minefields laid by both parties were located within and outside of the buffer
zone. At the launch of the project, 101 minefields were recorded on the island; 53 outside the
buffer zone and 48 inside. The EC-funded Partnership for the Future (PFF) Mine Action
Centre (MAC) was established in Nicosia to carry out de-mining activities. Four projects have
7

The estimate was based on a safety zone 2 km wide on either side of the former confrontational line.
EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
VERSION 2008-12-18 | 6

been financed by the EC so far.
One project is financed by the EC Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community. The
Contribution Agreement was signed between the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and the EC on 28 March 2007. However, due to Turkish Army’s denial of access to
both the relevant information and to the minefields, it was impossible to undertake an
effective project and it was being considered for suspension. In August 2007 the Turkish
Army agreed to co-operate and the project resumed with minefield clearance operations
commencing on 13 August 2007. This resulted in five months delay with budgetary
implications. In December 2007 UNFICYP and the Turkish Army agreed to extend the
demining areas to cover 26 more minefields in 16 areas within the buffer zone containing
mines of Turkish origin.
Additionally several new suspect dangerous areas have also been reported since the start of
the project, which would have given a starting total of 71 in the buffer zone, an increase of
67%, and a total of 122 on the island. The Turkish Forces records indicate that the remaining
minefields contain approximately 20,000 landmines; an increase of over 50% on all previous
estimates. The types of mines are divided into two main categories: anti-tank (5,000) and antipersonnel (15,000). Furthermore, the minefield records shows that a total of 81 booby-traps
were laid in three minefields. These records do not provide accurate information as to which
mines have been booby-trapped. These developments slowed down the de-mining activities
and increased the costs.
To date the project has released over four km² of land. Top priority has been placed on
clearing minefields related to the opening of future crossing points, followed by land for
agricultural purposes. Agreed tasks include 20,000 Turkish mines to be cleared, releasing 8
km2. The current funding is not sufficient to finish these tasks. The MAC foresees that
demining activities may continue only until December 2008 with the current funds clearing
18 of the 26 minefields.
EUR 5M is required to complete the mine clearance activities in an efficient and effective
manner, allowing a mine-free buffer zone to be delivered by the end of 2010. If the funding is
not provided then the overall cost and time to complete the project will increase
considerably.8
The June 2002 United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) mission to Cyprus found that
the minefields in the buffer zone pose a minimal threat to communities. Farmers are currently
using the land adjacent to the mined areas and, in most cases, farmers have cultivated land to
within 2m of the minefield/force protection perimeter fence. While there are some reports of
livestock losses due to mine accidents, the physical danger to local inhabitants is relatively
minor, with the last reported human casualty occurring in March 2008.
When two parties agree to remove the lethal barriers between them, as both sides have agreed
and are doing in Cyprus, it is a promising sign of their intentions for the future. In addition to
the humanitarian, and development aspects, the political impact of mine clearance in Cyprus
is significant, both through the elimination of physical barriers that divide the two sides and as
a confidence building measure for other bi-communal initiatives. Mine action has proven to
be one of the most important and successful confidence-building measures taken since 1975.
Mine action facilitates the opening of new crossing points while paving the way for economic
integration of the two sides, and is consistent with the Green Line regulation approved
between the Government of Cyprus and the European Council. The project also assists both
sides in fulfilling their legal obligations towards the APMBC to which both Turkey and the
Republic of Cyprus are signatories.
8

Correspondence from the EC Delegation on 28 July 2008.
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KOSOVO
Kosovo became contaminated by landmines and ERW, primarily unexploded UXO, during
the conflict between Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian fighters in the late 1980s, and in the
war between the FRY and NATO in 1999. A major demining operation by international
NGOs and commercial companies was co-ordinated by UNMAS from June 1999 to
December 2001. Since then clearance capacity has been reduced significantly. The extent of
residual contamination is the subject of dispute.
The Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Co-ordinator (OKPCC) reported that, as of March
2007, there were 11 dangerous areas requiring clearance and 47 other areas requiring
technical survey and possibly clearance. According to the OKPCC, both contamination
records and the pattern of recent incidents indicated that UXO such as hand-grenades and submunitions posed the main threat, and the threat from anti-personnel mines was limited.
HALO Trust, however, believes the extent of contamination significantly exceeds the
OKPCC’s current estimates and that Kosovo still faces a significant threat from ERW,
particularly anti-personnel landmines. In a survey started in late 2006, HALO Trust identified
86 suspected mine hazards and 23 suspected hazards requiring battle area clearance in
addition to those recorded by the OKPCC. Around 1 in 5 of these areas was not previously
suspected to be contaminated; the remainder were areas not fully cleared in earlier operations.
HALO Trust believes that a further 10 years of clearance is required to reduce the threat to
that of Western European levels.
GICHD conducted an assessment of information management practices and controls in
Kosovo at the request of OKPCC, in large part to assess HALO Trust’s claims that problems
in management practices were leading to a significant underestimate of the extent of
remaining contamination. GICHD found some minor problems with information management
practices in the OKPCC EOD Management Section, but concluded that these did not
significantly affect the estimate of remaining contamination. The report stated that, “there
does not seem to be a large scale unknown problem with mines/UXO in Kosovo.” It pointed
out there has not been a mine casualty in more than two years.
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) personnel report that, although Kosovo does not have a
significant mine/ERW problem, the real or perceived threat of residual contamination
continues to deny people use of agricultural land and access to resources such as firewood. It
has also led the population to abandon traditional grazing of herds on high pastures and to
transfer arable land to pasture in order to maintain herds, resulting in reduced crop production.
MACEDONIA
In September 2006 Macedonia reported having cleared the mine threat previously identified
on its north western border with Kosovo and Albania, leaving it free to concentrate on a
bigger problem of ERW, both UXO and AXO, most of it dating back to the First and Second
World Wars.
In the north-western border regions, conflict in 2001 between government forces and ethnicAlbanian insurgents resulted in contamination that affected about 80 villages. In the south, the
250 km-long border with Greece from is affected by UXO from the two World Wars. The
district of Bitola has an estimated 8.2 km2 of contaminated land. Past discoveries of
significant quantities of ERW also indicate the risk of further contamination in other districts.
Up to 2004, some 200,000 different pieces of ERW were found and destroyed in Macedonia,
mostly 75 to 120 mm artillery shells. But the discovery in 2006 of a 200 kg air-dropped bomb
in the centre of the capital and a 300 kg bomb on farmland in the Prilep area illustrated the
presence of a wider range of contamination.
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The Protection and Rescue Directorate says UXO has rendered significant areas of land
unusable and have had a negative impact on economic development, disrupting road
communications, hampering tourism and affecting cross-border communications.
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro is contaminated by landmines and ERW, mainly as a result of conflicts during
the break-up of the former FRY in the 1990s.
Two sections of the border with Albania are contaminated mainly by mines. One area is 81
km long and was mined by the Army in 1991; another area is a 5.9 km stretch of the border
with 65 smaller areas containing 613 landmines laid by Serbian forces during the 1999
conflict.
Two other areas are contaminated with UXO, mainly sub-munitions from NATO air strikes in
1999. One is on the border with Kosovo, where there are two contaminated locations. A
survey jointly managed by the CROMAC and Montenegro’s Regional Centre for Divers’
Training and Underwater Demining (RCUD) in July 2006 found 394,700 m2 of land affected
by sub-munitions. The other suspected area is located near the capital, affecting four villages
surrounding the airport.
The communities affected by mines and ERW are among the least economically developed in
the country. Firewood collection and trade in lumber are the main sources of income for some
inhabitants of affected villages and survival pressures force people to use forested areas that
are known to be contaminated. However, most of the casualties of sub-munitions since the air
strikes have been children.
The Adriatic Sea adjoining Montenegro is also contaminated with underwater UXO, most of
it dating back to the two World Wars and the 1991-95 conflict in the FRY. About 75 tonnes
of missiles and grenades were cleared from the sea in 2002. The location of residual
underwater UXO contamination is unknown as most of it was dumped in the sea by local
inhabitants. Most underwater clearance results from reports of UXO spotted by tourist divers
or fisherman.
RUSSIA/CHECHNYA
Chechnya is heavily contaminated by landmines ERW, but there are no official estimates of
the full extent of the contamination. In April 2007 a media report quoted the Ministry of
Emergencies for Chechnya as claiming that “6,000 hectares of land [60 km2] constitute a
threat to the population.” The UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007 quotes the
Engineering Department of the North Caucasus Military District as confirming that “123
formal minefields of all types have been laid in Chechnya since the start of the conflict” and
that “all parties to the conflict have used mines around checkpoints, temporary positions and
military bases.” The report also estimates that 15% (about 40 tonnes) of all ammunition used
in the fighting for Grozny did not explode. Improvised explosive devices were also found.
According to media reports, Russian and Chechen officials from the Ministry of Emergencies
and experts have estimated that it will take at least 10 years to clear Chechnya of all mines,
because they lack both technical experts and records of mined areas.
The impact of mines and ERW is said to go beyond the physical harm to include “serious
economic and psychosocial effects on residents and internally displaced persons.”
Contamination is said to be also found on farmland, including cultivated areas and pastures.
Adverse conditions force some people to engage in risky activities such as collecting food or
firewood from the forest and scrap metal from UXO. UNICEF reported that some 3,061
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civilians (including 753 children) had been killed or injured by landmines and UXO in
Chechnya between 1995 and the end of October 2006.
SERBIA
Serbia is contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and also has extensive
areas affected by cluster sub-munitions, large air-dropped bombs and other ERW. The extent
of mine contamination is relatively small; a legacy of the armed conflict associated with the
break-up of the former FRY in the early 1990s.
Minefields with a mixture of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines are located on the border
with Croatia, extending from where Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and BiH meet to the BelgradeZagreb highway.
In addition, UXO from previous wars, mainly unexploded sub-munitions from NATO air
strikes in 1999, remain a problem. Many traces of cluster-munition use are still evident but
some areas adjoin the Ground Safety Zone bordering Kosovo, and therefore fall under
military jurisdiction instead of the Serbian MAC.
The 1999 NATO air strikes also scattered unexploded air-dropped bombs across Serbia. In
March 2006 the Serbian MAC reported that some 60 930-kg air-dropped bombs and other
large projectiles were believed to be in the ground at a depth of up to 20 m in 43 locations, as
well as in the Danube and Sava rivers.
An explosion at the Ministry of Defence ammunition storage facility in Paracin on 19 October
2006 resulted in contamination of surrounding areas with UXO and led to classification of
Paracin and Cuprija as suspected hazardous areas.
The mine/ERW contamination remaining in Serbia affects pastures, gardens, orchards, woods
and agricultural land; much of it in already impoverished rural communities as well as in
rivers and irrigation channels. People are said to be fearful as it has caused casualties among
residents and their livestock, and damage to farm equipment. The presence of sub-munitions
in some of the country’s ski resorts and national parks affects tourism, wildlife and the
environment.
UKRAINE
The situation for Ukraine is very similar to that explained above for Belarus. EUR 6M was
allocated to assist in the destruction of the stockpile of 6M PFM-1 mines. The EC launched a
study in 2002 to prepare the destruction of the mines and some trials were undertaken by the
Science and Technology Institute of Ukraine.9 In June 2005 the EC announced that it had
concluded the negotiation with the government of Ukraine and in late June 2005 the EC
announced a tender for the destruction of the mines with work to begin in January 2006 and
completion within 36 months. A contractor was appointed in December 200510 to undertake
the work. There are varying stories why the contract was terminated.
•

One is that the Ukraine demanded the money first and the EC demanded accession
first. However, the APMBC entered into force for Ukraine on 1 June 2006 and it was
not until April 2007 that the project was terminated by the contractor.

9

P Krejsa. EC Project for the Destruction of PFM-1 Stockpiles in Ukraine. Presented to the Standing Committee
Meetings (Stockpile Destruction) on 12 February 2004.
10
A consortium including Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH (Germany), GRV
Luthe Kampfmittelbeseitigung GmbH (Germany), DYNASAFE AB (Sweden) and Ingenieurbüro Döring GmbH
(Germany),
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•

Another is that GTZ (part of the contracting consortium) sub-contracted to a
Ukrainian firm the development of a system to dismantle certain PFM canisters. The
GTZ consortium was responsible for obtaining the necessary permits and it was
expected that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence would grant all necessary permits
and provide a suitable location for the destruction activities. On 18 April 2007 the
contract was terminated by GTZ on the grounds of “non-fulfilment by the government
of Ukraine of their obligations, which have made it impossible for GTZ consortium to
fulfil their contractual obligations.”

There are a number of explanations for the failure of the project, which vary according to the
different actors involved. The primary problems seem to revolve around the selection of a
suitable location for the destruction and the issuance and revocation of environmental permits
by local authorities. However, negotiations have started again and the Ukraine has started
destroying part of its stockpile with its own money.

CASUALTIES
It has not been possible to obtain detailed casualty statistics for all the countries shown in
Table 2 and those data that exist can be confusing. Some countries – such as Montenegro – do
not keep a relevant database11. The Table at Annex 4 sets out what information is available,
most of which comes from the Landmine Monitor 2007. Some general trends can be
identified.
•

The number of casualties due to landmines in South East Europe is small and,
generally, falling. BiH has the highest number at present but again the trend is
downward.

•

There is an increase in casualties due to tampering with ERW either for fun or in
order to sell for its scrap metal value. This is especially true in the Ukraine but it
appears to happen more widely.

•

Cluster munitions appear to be a reducing problem in all the countries shown.

There are other countries and regions of the world where the casualties are many time higher
than in South East Europe.

EC SUPPORT FOR APMBC COMPLIANCE
INTRODUCTION
Of the countries listed in Table 2, only Macedonia and Belarus (the latter has never declared
any minefields) have met their Article 5 obligations.12 Five others are likely to do so before
their deadlines expire. BiH and Croatia will not meet their deadlines and both have submitted
an extension request, each for an additional ten years. The situation for Kosovo and
Russia/Chechnya is irrelevant from the Treaty perspective since neither is a States Party and
Landmine Monitor shows mines still being used in Chechnya.
So far as the Article 4 obligation13 is concerned (and ignoring Kosovo and Russia/Chechnya
again), all countries have met their deadlines with the exception of Belarus and the Ukraine
who are unlikely to meet their deadlines because of the PFM-1 problem. Neither has
submitted a request for an extension.

11

Landmine Monitor 2007, page 526.
To clear all known minefields.
13
To clear all stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines.
12
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The evaluation team notes that full compliance with the APMBC in its present form includes
achieving “clearance of all known mined areas” status. However, the EC Mine Action
Strategy 2005 to 2007 has as its title “Towards zero victims”, and in most affected countries
in South East Europe victim rates are already low. Article 6 of the Convention places an
expectation on those countries “ …in a position to do so…” to assist those with fewer
resources in achieving clearance. Nevertheless this is not a full obligation and clearing all
known mined areas, especially within a short time period, is prohibitively expensive in some
countries. Use of scarce resources to do this where there is little or no socio-economic impact
is difficult to justify unless there are overriding political considerations.
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT
Based on the information the Study Team has been able to collect, a little over EUR 38M has
been spent over the review period. In addition, EUR 10M has been earmarked but not spent
(Belarus and Ukraine). Another EUR 2M may have been spent (in Russian/Chechnya and
Serbia) but that has not been confirmed.
A list of known expenditure is at Annex 2.
COUNTRIES SUPPORTED
Since 2002 the EC appears to have supported mine action in countries of South East Europe
(see Table 2) with BiH and Croatia receiving the most support.
It should be noted that once a country becomes an EU member state it is no longer eligible for
any of these funds. It is an issue well recognised by Croatia and it is hoped that pre-accession
funds will be available. It is, perhaps, a paradox of EC rules that as the EU expands, fewer
countries will be eligible for this financial support. This is especially important for Croatia
which has requested a ten year extension to its APMBC Article 5 obligation (to 2019) but it
seems very likely that it will be an EU member state long before its mine contamination is
cleared.
TYPE OF ORGANISATION SUPPORTED
Mine clearance in South East Europe is a mixture of national military, police and civil
defence organisations, national and international NGOs, and commercial companies. At one
time, funds to these organisations were channelled through the International Trust Fund (ITF)
which is discussed later.
There appears to be a clear preference given to NGOs, and national – rather than international
– organisations (including commercials) seem well supported. That makes sense from a
capacity development perspective so long as the organisations can demonstrate both quality
and value for money.
MINE ACTION COMPONENTS SUPPORTED
All components of mine action have been supported in South East Europe. All the ‘five
pillars’ of mine action have been supported.
•

Demining. The majority of the projects funded by the EC have focussed on clearing
land of landmines and other forms of UXO. For Bosnia and Croatia, it remains their
greatest need. All other countries listed in Table 2 are less affected.

•

Advocacy. The EC has funded both the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL) which works with governments and the Geneva Call which works with Non
State Actors (NSA).
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•

MRE. Is often conducted as part of a demining project but it can be done as a
separate activity as may have been the case in Russia/Chechnya through UNICEF.14

•

Victim Assistance. Apart from the 2006 project in BiH, victim assistance does not
appear to be well supported by the EC. This is slightly surprising given the secondary
title of the 2005 – 2007 mine action strategy of “towards zero victims”.

•

Stockpile destruction. By far the highest value projects the EC is prepared to fund is
the destruction of the stockpiles of PFM-1 Landmines in Belarus and the Ukraine. If
they were to actually take place, EUR 10M has been allocated. It remains to be seen
whether, and when, this money is actually spent.

EVALUATION OF EC STRATEGY
COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS (CSP)
The inclusion of mine action in the national (or regional) CSP, which itself is based on
national government priorities, has assumed increasing importance in recent years, due to:
•

the commitment of the EC to the Paris Declaration;

•

the ending of thematic budget lines and start of the four new Instruments the basis for
funding development co-operation by the EC.

The very limited inclusion of mine action in the CSPs of South East Europe countries with
ERW contamination suggests that the problem is not a critical issue for many countries.
The CSP for Bosnia makes mention of anti-personnel landmines only briefly:
“Other EC instruments
The activities are designed to complement the other support being provided to
Croatia and FRY in the area of return under CARDS. Demining in BiH is also
undertaken with other funds from the General Budget of the European Union
specifically allocated for actions against anti-personnel landmines.”15
The CSP for Croatia is not too dissimilar:
“Other EC instruments
Assistance under the regional CARDS programme will be given to measures for
refugee return that involve more than one country in the region . . . Demining in
Croatia is also undertaken with other funds from the general budget of the EU,
specifically allocated for actions against anti-personnel landmines”.16
In contrast the regional strategy paper makes no mention at all of landmines.17
To put this sparse mention of mine action in context, under the new financial instruments the
EC can allocate money to mine action only when it is mentioned in one of the national
strategic plans. That can be a national development plan, a poverty reduction strategy paper
and so on.
14

www.unicef.org/russia/media_4224.html
Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper, 2002-2006, page 35.
16
Croatia Country Strategy Paper, 2002-2006. CARDS. Page 37.
17
CARDS Assistance Program to the Western Balkans Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006.
15
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This appears not to be a problem for Croatia, but there is a real risk that the BiH government
will fail to explicitly mention the problem of landmines in any of its strategic documents.
This was quite clearly brought to the attention of the Director of BHMAC by the Delegation
and by the Study Team but he seemed little interested in making sure this happened. This is
not a case of lack of clarity; it is a simple lack of concern. However, the Delegation in BiH is
confident that mine action will be mentioned in the relevant documents.
COUNTRY SELECTION CRITERIA
In the 2005 Global Review of EC mine action, the criteria and mechanism for selecting
countries to receive support to mine action were discussed in some detail. In selecting which
countries to focus on, and also the actions to be supported in each country, the use of
Resilience-Impact Matrix (RIM) was proposed. “Resilience” is the term used in risk and
disaster management for the ability to recover from a disabling event, this attribute is very
much the same as that usually described by the term “Capacity” for development potential,
and either resilience or capacity could be used in developing this visual approach.18 There is a
clear need to set objective and verifiable selection criteria in terms of relevance – i.e. select
which actions in which places will most contribute to realising the overall strategic goals.
Not unreasonably, the EC requires some action by the country it seeks to support. The two
key actions are:
•

“EC assistance for mine clearance will only be provided to States Parties to the
Treaty.”19 This statement also applies to stockpile destruction. “This restriction can
be lifted for situations of “serious humanitarian risk”. A relaxation is also possible
where “…there is evidence of a country’s serious willingness to take responsibility
for the mines problem …”.

•

The need to recognise mine action in the national strategic policy documents has been
mentioned above.

These relaxations have allowed funding to be provided in Russia/Chechnya and in Kosovo
(covered initially under Serbia’s accession to the APMBC but only after 2004).
SUSTAINABILITY
Many EC-funded projects had a very strong emphasis on training and equipping deminers, so
might be expected to have strong sustainability. Given the definition that “Sustainability is
concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after
donor funding has been withdrawn”, all of these projects had good sustainability so far as it
was possible to confirm. There is no doubt that Croatia has a sustainable programme and, to
some extent, all the other country programmes are sustainable. The exception might be BiH
with its high level of mistrust and poor transparency.20
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF PROJECTS WITH POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES
It could be argued that all mine action projects in South East Europe have a political
dimension. Given its proximity to the present borders of the EU, the region is of considerable
18

The RIM diagram is based on the concept of “Resilience” as applied to a country contaminated with ERW – a
typical dictionary definition of resilience is Merriam-Webster’s “an ability to recover from or adjust easily to
misfortune or change”. In mine action an example is the name of the “Cranfield Resilience Centre”, part of
Cranfield University.
19
The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target. The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-Annual
Indicative Programming 2005-2007.
20
See the BiH country report.
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strategic importance. Many of the countries in the region are hoping for, or actively seeking,
EU membership and there is obvious value in assisting states to clear the explosive residue of
recent conflicts. Whilst there may have been a political imperative behind the support
initially, it is now clear that the projects being funded are selected on merit.
INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINING AND MINE VICTIMS
ASSISTANCE (ITF)
ITF is a humanitarian, non-profit organisation devoted to the eradication of landmines.21 It
was established by the Slovenian Government in March 1998 with significant support from
the US Department of State (USDoS). ITF’s original objective was to help countries in South
East Europe to solve their landmine problems, while also helping landmine survivors with
their physical and socio-economic rehabilitation. It did this by acting as a channel for donor
funding and undertaking the contact and project supervision and monitoring. Its unique
selling points were two-fold.
•

Firstly, for every dollar (or equivalent) provided by a donor, the USDoS would match
it with another dollar. There is a limit to this matching facility which is decided by
the US Congress on a yearly basis. Although the matching funds will be spent in the
country attracting the initial donor funding, it might not be spent on the same project.

•

ITF offers project management and financial management of mine action projects. It
charges 3% of the project value for carrying out these functions although this is only
possible because ITF receives a subsidy from the Slovenian Government.

ITF’s activities have spread to other mine affected countries in the region and it is now
working in Albania, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. It is also operating in
the Caucasus, and elsewhere, and has ambitions to work further afield.
UNDP offers a similar project management capability to ITF but charges up to 13% for its
service. Thus ITF appears to offer much better value for money, especially when linked to
the US government matching fund.
ITF is a parastatal Slovenian, organisation with diplomatic status. As Slovenia has acceded to
the EU, it is no longer possible for the EC to channel funds for mine action through an
organisation that forms part of a government of the EU. Prior to Slovenia’s accession to the
EU in 2004, some of the EC funding for mine action was channelled through the ITF. The
ITF handled the tendering process and sought to ensure that the locations targeted for
clearance were appropriate and met the donor’s criteria.
One of authors of this report has been part of a team undertaking a strategic review of ITF
which recommended a range of future strategic options. It was clear during the review that
donors were very comfortable with the role played by ITF and had no concerns about its
competence, transparency and honesty. That is not a view entirely shared by the national
mine action authorities in the region and the BHMAC, in particular, was vocal in its
criticisms. It is, perhaps, worthy of note that the BiH Ministry of Justice is investigating
allegations of corruption in the mine action sector in BiH using international investigators.
There is a paradox with the matching funds in Croatia. The US Embassy there allocates about
USD 2M to mine action in Croatia, all of it channelled through the ITF. However, because
not enough other donors are putting their funding via ITF more than half of the USD 2M
remains unspent because there was not enough non-US funding to be matched.

21

http://www.itf-fund.si/dokumenti/dokument.asp?id=2
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ITF is currently evaluating its status and it is likely to transform itself into an international
organisation. Should this happen, it would once again become eligible to be a channel for EC
funding to mine action. Given the matching fund possibility and the 3% overhead charge, it
should be considered by the EC as a partner, as it was prior to 2004. Perhaps more
importantly, it is an effective way of reducing the problems of fragmentation and isolation felt
by some Delegations.

REFORMS TO EC FOREIGN

POLICY AND THE IMPACT ON MINE ACTION

INTRODUCTION
The response of the European Institutions to “the antipersonnel landmine problem” has had
three principal dimensions:
•

A political response, principally in support of the APMBC and its implementation
and universalisation.

•

An aid and development response to the impact of landmines (or suspected mines) on
local people, and also on development activities, in mine affected countries. This
includes MRE, demining, victim assistance and other activities. There is also
emergency aid (humanitarian aid) administered by ECHO, principally emergency
mine awareness training and emergency mine clearance.

•

A security response, principally where the presence of mines or ERW could lead to
instability in a country or region (typically by initiating or prolonging a conflict) or
where the presence of stockpiles or dumps of abandoned munitions could create
security problems.

The APL regulation was developed by the EC for the 2002-2004 and subsequently 2005-2007
strategies. The regulation established a thematic or horizontal budget line for mine action of
roughly EUR 15M per year 2002-2004 rising to about EUR 19M per year 2005-2007, which
complemented the mine action funding available from geographic (national or regional) and
other EC and EDF budget lines, as well as bilateral donations from EU member states. In the
entire period 2002-7, the thematic budget line comprised about 40% of the EC contribution
and about 10% of the total if Member States’ bilateral donations are included.
The horizontal budget line opened up two possibilities in addition to funding geographically
based mine action:
•

Funding non-geographic activities such as the global support for ‘universalisation’ of
the APMBC.

•

Creating a small core group of staff in Brussels who could provide a focal point of
knowledge and information about mine action and would also provide the resources
to generate the EC-wide mine action strategy and ensure the agreement of all relevant
directorates general (in itself a significant task).

The process of enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25, then 27, members led to the need for a
re-think of the entire Foreign Policy structures and instruments. The previous approach was
no longer viable for a much larger community. Reorganisation led to a significant
streamlining which had significant impacts on both the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and the way that foreign development aid was to be addressed, including mine action.
Essentially, a multiplicity of old instruments and many small individual thematic budget lines
were to be replaced by just four new instruments:
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•

Instrument for Stability (IfS)22;

•

Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI)23;

•

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)24;

•

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)25.

Mine action is only partly covered by the new Instrument for Stability as it can only be
triggered in certain circumstances and with certain constraints. This is discussed in detail in
the new guidance document produced by DG RELEX which was seen as the final draft of this
evaluation was being completed26.
DECONCENTRATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS
DECLARATION
The process of ‘deconcentration’ in EuropeAid which moved programming and project
management from Brussels to the EC Delegations in the partner countries or regions, was
both an essential early stage of the reforms to the instruments, and was also one step of
several in moving to aid delivery based on partnership between the countries involved, rather
than donor policy alone.
The strong commitment of the EU to the Paris Declaration of March 2005 is part of the
overall reform of development aid and the move towards development co-operation. Article
16, paragraph 1, of the Paris Declaration is perhaps the key:
“Donors commit to: Base their overall support ... country strategies, policy
dialogues and development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in
implementing these strategies.”
EC support for mine action is thus to be based on the established CSPs written by the EC
Delegations in partner countries, in close co-ordination with national authorities and
governments. The CSPs will reflect the development strategies of the national governments,
including poverty reduction strategies and other plans. This is a significant change in some
areas which had previously relied in part on funding through thematic budget lines, one of
which was for mine action. This may provide an opportunity for mine action to benefit from
synergies with other funding areas.
MINE ACTION STRATEGY WITHIN THE THREE PILLARS OF THE EU
The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht which established the EU, divided EU policies into
three main areas, called pillars.
•
•
•

The first or ‘Community’ pillar concerns economic, social and environmental
policies.
The second or CFSP pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters.
The third or ‘Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters’ (PJCC) pillar
concerns co-operation in the fight against crime.

The aid and development aspects of mine action are first pillar responsibilities and the
security aspects are second pillar. Generally, mine action has been considered to be within
22

Regulation (EC) 1717/2006 was adopted on 15 November 2006.
Regulation (EC) 1905/2006 was adopted on 18 December 2006.
24
Regulation (EC) 1638/2006 was adopted on 24 October 2006.
25
Regulation (EC) 1085/2006 was adopted on 17 July 2006.
26
See Commission Staff Working Document. Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013.
23
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the first pillar, so the procedures are that the Parliament would enact legislation, and the EC
would be responsible for development and implementation of mine action strategy. The APL
horizontal budget lines provided a mechanism to fund some of the aspects of mine action not
associated with geographic budget lines.
For the second pillar, the relevant bodies are usually the Council Secretariat proposing
projects, which are implemented by joint action at an inter-governmental level by Member
State ministries (possibly by a sub-group of member states) after agreement by consensus in
the European Council.
This may appear a small difference, but currently, since the reforms of 2006 which removed
the thematic budget lines and introduced the four new Instruments, it has the potential to
impact on EC mine action. Firstly, it further increases already serious fragmentation by
bringing in an entire new “pillar” with different procedures. Secondly it could mean mine
action is regarded more as a security issue than a development issue.
IMPACT OF THE REFORMS ON MINE ACTION
The new EC instruments appear to have taken the mine action community by surprise in
2006. Inside the EC, staff who worked on the APL horizontal budget line do not appear to
have issued an advance warning to the mine action community and the longer term
implications were not addressed in time.
The overall effect is that the new instruments have some negative consequences and now
require attention in time for the review of the instruments in 2009. The changes could lead to
a reduction of the funding for mine action by the EC in the short term as all mine action has to
be funded from geographic budget lines. This requires the inclusion of mine action in CSPs
at their next review. In practice this may not matter much in South East Europe, with the
possible exception of BiH for reasons explained earlier.
The areas of mine action that, it appears, cannot easily be funded from geographic (country or
regional) budget lines as they have no clearly identifiable geographic component are:
•

Support for universalisation of the APMBC including linkage to ERW or cluster
munitions, as well as its general geographical extension to countries that are not yet
states parties. Arguably this is less important than before but it still remains a policy
objective.

•

Support for testing demining equipment and development of European Standards for
testing demining equipment, which in 2005-2007 received EUR 350,000. This was
previously through the International Test and Evaluation Programme (ITEP). The EC
has now withdrawn from ITEP but there are still important occasions when the EC
could help considerably.

•

Support for extending or revising International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and
similar issues with application in many countries. These are very important and form
the basis of the self-regulation within the mine action industry. All donors accept
them as statements of best practice and most governments of mine-affected countries
have adapted them. These are ‘living documents’ are require regular re-assessment
and revision.

•

Support for multi-country initiatives where there is either no regional mechanism
available (e.g. the countries are from different regions) or the regional mechanism has
not identified a role in mine action and hence has not included it in a regional strategy
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paper. This use of regional mechanisms in South East Europe is both limited and
fragile.
•

Support to organisations involving and committing non-state actors (NSAs) to abide
by the principles of the APMBC (which in 2005-7 received EUR 400,000) will now
have to be geographically based. Given that many NSAs who use mines are engaged
in armed conflict with national governments, it is most unlikely that the respective
governments would wish to see formal recognition of the NSAs in a CSP, which is
now the route to funding. Alternative funding routes have still to be developed, and
may require careful use of regional initiatives if funding for such organisations as
Geneva Call is to continue.

•

Donor funding for mine action is fragmented and the EC helped transparency by
holding Meetings of EU Mine Action Experts. It was at one of these that the new
Instrument – and the loss of the thematic budget line – was explained to other
Member State donors (even though, apparently, it was less well explained to
colleagues within the EC). As the EU expands and as explosive remediation issues
increase,27 this facilitating role will be missed and EU actions the poorer for its
absence.

FRAGMENTATION AND ISOLATION
Key issues already identified in the 2005 Global Review of EC Mine Action, as having a
negative impact, are:
•

wide dispersion (fragmentation) of funding and isolation of personnel resources
working on planning and implementing projects;

•

the increase in isolation due to deconcentration;

•

the difficulty in accessing technical support for improved contracting and monitoring.

With the possible exception of the dispersion of funding, these issues are further negatively
affected by the introduction of the new Instrument for Stability and may have negative
consequences for the following of the standard five development evaluation criteria: efficacy,
efficiency, and impact.
Fragmentation in this report is used to include all of the following:
•

Spreading limited resources thinly so that many countries receive small amounts of
support.

•

The relative scale of mine action resources being very significantly smaller than other
development aid budgets, meaning that there can never be a strong focus on mine
action, which has to be integrated as a small part of a larger portfolio.

•

The possibility that funding will be entirely project based so that repeat funding may
not be available before the end of a previous project, leading to a loss of efficiency.

Isolation is a corollary to fragmentation. Most project officers responsible for mine action
projects, whether in the Delegations or regional desk officers in Brussels, cannot be expected
to have specialist mines knowledge. There are several aspects to isolation:
27
The clarity of the APMBC message has been lost amidst an increasing number of new international treaties, such
as Protocol V to the CCW covering ERW, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
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•

The limited number of projects covered by one Delegation means that there is little or
no accumulated knowledge and know-how.

•

The small proportion of the workload means that staff cannot expend the significant
time required to become proficient or expert in mine action.

•

There are at present only very limited co-ordination mechanisms to permit staff from
different Delegations to share knowledge and experiences on mine action.

•

The normal turnover of staff in Delegations means that it is likely that most projects
will see a change of the project officer during the project duration, so the learning
process will be repeated and know-how lost.

Apart from Croatia, where there was a very experienced staff member overseeing mine
action,28 for most EC staff members, mine action comprises only a very small part of their
responsibilities. There is no point in having mine action specialists in the delegations for this
small workload.
The loss of a clear focal point in Brussels has had a negative impact in terms of building a
central knowledge base, as well as in areas of strategy development and support to nongeographic priorities. In an attempt to correct this, DG RELEX has prepared a ‘guidance’
document which, it is hoped, will address many of these problems. Unfortunately the
document had not been released by the time this report was finalised, so its value is unknown.
No doubt it will be a help but, by itself, it is unlikely to replace the value of a clear – human –
focal point in Brussels. The main concern is not the complexity of mine action (in its
expanded meaning29 ) – although it can be technically complex – it is the political profile it
enjoys. The EC has long been one of the key architects of the international response to the
problems caused by landmines and other ERW and that response will be weaker without a
better co-ordinated approach than is presently the case.
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE NEW INSTRUMENTS
The loss of the APL budget line is modest when compared to the whole of EU support to
mine action, and mine action is a very small part of the overall EC aid budget The challenge
is to make the reforms work better for mine action and to continue funding activities which
are still important but have been excluded. A total return to the status quo ante is clearly not
possible but, given its cross-cutting importance across many sectors, consideration should be
given to creating a special budgetary mechanism for mine action.
There was a lack of information in most of the mine action community prior to the EC aid
reforms, and no dialogue with the EC Delegations in South East Europe to ensure a smooth
transition. The Delegation staff appeared to have been taken by surprise by a financial
instrument which had been published only as a proposal some two years earlier. Improved
communication within the EC would appear to be necessary. If work with national
governments and organisations had started earlier, there would have been time to ensure that
CSPs of some mine affected countries more adequately reflected the need for mine action.
There is a need to initiate co-ordination of experiences and opinions in time for the mid-term
review of the CSPs and the first review of the new Instruments.
The Global Review in 2005 made a number of recommendations regarding the selection of
countries, selection of projects, and selection of implementers which have not been
28

He has now retired.
Mine action is being used as a collective term to include ERW, cluster weapons and, to some extent the
clearance of military munition depots whose contents are becoming unsafe.
29
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implemented. These recommendations were – and still are – highly pertinent to the current
situation in South East Europe.

KEY ISSUES ARISING
FRAGMENTATION OF EC PERSONAL RESOURCES
This has been discussed at length already.
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
The ending of the thematic APL budget line has removed a clear focal point for developing a
multi-annual mine action strategy. It is understood that such a strategy will continue to be
developed within RELEX. However, there are some communication issues the identification
of who is responsible for what within RELEX and, especially, between RELEX in Brussels
and the Delegations. Staff in Delegations in South East Europe responsible for mine action
projects were not always well aware of who in Brussels would be able to provide further
information on strategy or who was responsible for developing future strategy.
Mine action is an area of considerable political sensitivity, and has a significantly higher
political profile than many other development activities. The European Parliament continues
to show interest in the topic of mines and ERW:
•

On 16 January 2006, reference was made to landmines in the European Parliament
resolution on disability and development.

•

On 23 May 2007 in the discussion on the annual report from the Council to the
European Parliament on the main aspects of basic choices of the CFSP a reference to
universalisation of the APMBC was proposed.

•

On 12 December 2007 passed a resolution calling for continued support for mine
action, including the reinstatement of the horizontal budget line.

There is a real risk that the future strategy could be clear on the political aspects, including
developmental approaches, to the detriment of a sound technical foundation. All three aspects
(political, developmental, and technical) are important in an overall strategy and it is far from
clear that there is an adequate focus on the technical, nor the resources available to support
this aspect.
DELEGATION STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR PROJECT SELECTION AND
IMPLEMENTATION
Without concerted action, EC staff responsible for mine action projects will continue to be
isolated and without easy access to enough information or to knowledgeable colleagues who
could provide guidance. An initiative is required urgently to provide delegation staff with, at
the very least:
•

a comprehensive set of briefing and reference documents so that they can retrieve
essential information readily;

•

strategy guidance;

•

practical guidance on what can, and cannot be expected as an outcome of the mine
action project.

There is a clear need for EC co-financed mine action projects throughout the region (and
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preferably throughout the world) to be based on common standards and to learn from each
others’ experience. Regular (though not necessarily frequent) contact between all staff
working on mine action projects in EC Delegations in South East Europe would be helpful.
Even if such contact is no more than a regular conference phone call the impact could be
significant both in information exchange and reduction of fragmentation.
CONTRACT ISSUES
EC Delegation staff, who are development specialists with little or no experience of mine
action and no specialist technical knowledge about demining, are negotiating project contracts
with specialist staff of the mine action centres or potential contractors who have detailed
technical knowledge, and considerable experience in the field. They may, very likely, have
their own vested interests.
EC staff do not have the time or resources to be able to become fully informed about the
technicalities of demining, but increased access to core information would help to alleviate
this. Identifying and using a mechanism to bring in even a small amount of independent
expert guidance at the contract preparation stage might offer significant benefits.
RECENT INITIATIVES
Perhaps in recognition of the concerns expressed in this, and earlier, reports, the EC has very
recently published two documents which should go a long way to alleviate many of the
concerns expressed in this section. One provides guidance to staff members30 and the other
provides advice to donors31 of which, of course, the EC is one. The first was written
internally and the latter was commissioned through an external consultancy company. Both
should be of interest and helpful to Delegation staff and others having to manage mine action
issues.
The former merits some comment. Firstly it is a very good document providing the EC logic
behind what could be done in the future in light of the changes within the EC explained
earlier in this report. It provides clear guidance on what instruments can be used and any
difficulties with them. It looks to the period 2009-2013 and whilst it stops short of claiming
to be a new strategy it “... sets out to provide valid follow-up to the previous EC Mine Action
Strategy 2005-2007 and to give guidance to steer Commission’s Desk Officers and
Programmers both at Headquarters and in EC Delegations in mine-affected countries in their
mine Action programming”32. The document seeks to “... provide a basis for building synergy
within the peace/security and development/co-operation nexus ...”33.
A concern expressed above is that of the isolation felt by Delegation staff and the new
guidance mentions three ways in which this may be overcome:
•

To improve co-ordination it recognises the need for “... regular inter-service meetings
and reporting on mine action funding among the external services involved ...”34.
This is likely to be through the medium of the Mine Action Co-ordination Group
(MACG) but it is very unlikely that many Delegations will ever be able to attend the
meetings. The outcomes from the meetings should be shared with Delegations.

30

Commission Staff Working Document. Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013. Published
on 25 September 2008.
31
Advice for Donors on Setting up and Running Mine Action Programmes. Lot No 4 – Sectorial and project
evaluations – Contract for Services 2006/128168 Version 1. ECORYS Nederland BV, 25 February 2008.
32
Commission Staff Working Document. Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013. Page 3.
33
Ibid, page 4.
34
Ibid, page 9.
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•

Because of the complexities of co-ordination, reporting mechanisms need to be
improved and this is discussed at length35. Although it is mainly to help identify
lessons learned and create institutional memory, its implementation should create
additional information streams. Care will be needed in Brussels to ensure that it does
not just receive information but that it disseminates information back to Delegations.

•

“Whereas DG RELEX (Unit A4) will have the overall lead and co-ordination role, it
is to each DG (RELEX, DEV, ELARG, ECHO and AIDCO) to monitor the effective
integration of EC mine action into development policies ...”36. The clarity this brings
is helpful but there is a significant risk that Delegations will get different messages
from different DGs.

Any improvement in co-ordination is to be welcomed and whilst the DGs in Brussels clearly
need to co-ordinate effectively, the needs of the Delegations for clear information and
guidance must not be forgotten.

35
36

Ibid, page 17.
Ibid, page 20.
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Although landmines and ERW are far from the largest problem facing humankind, the EC has
a proud history of mitigating this particular problem. The EC alone was recognised as the
second largest single donor to mine action, and the EU collectively is the biggest donor. That
response has not happened by accident but has evolved – mostly successfully – allowing
significant benefits in very many countries. The EC is rightly seen as a very bureaucratic
institution but, despite often heard criticisms, it functioned well and its complexities were
reasonably well understood. It is one outcome of the law of unintended consequences that
attempts to reduce bureaucracy are a significant threat to the (now expected) value of EC
support to mine action.
There may be much that needs improving in EC procedures and processes, but there are some
that would benefit from being left alone. The new financial instrument is unlikely to be
reversed, but there are issues listed under the recommendations that merit consideration at the
next review. The end of the first ten years of the APMBC is fast approaching but, given its
political momentum, mine action (as well as ERW and cluster munitions) will continue to be
a high profile topic. It is very much hoped that the EC will continue to be a large and
effective partner.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

The issue of fragmentation of EC mine action in South East Europe and the isolation
of EC staff responsible for mine action projects should be addressed with some
urgency.

2.

A clear and effective focal point for guiding EC-funded mine action should be reestablished in Brussels.

3.

CSPs must be brought up-to-date to reflect the requirements of the new instrument.

4.

A new budgetary mechanism is required to fund those actions which are not the
responsibility of the Delegations.

5.

A new global mine action strategy is required.

6.

Lack of mine action expertise within the EC Delegations in South East Europe is a
problem, but it could be mitigated by using external expertise such as the ITF. It
could manage the competitive contracting process of behalf of the EC, as was once
the case.
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ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in South East Europe
2002-2007
1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Europe to
generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects,
programmes, and policies.
2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
− To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine affected countries
in Europe 2002-2006;
EC strategy documents for Europe, including enlargement strategies and progress reports for
candidate and potential candidate countries, etc.
− To analyse the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in Europe, and across the
various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
− To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the
beneficiary countries;
supporting local mine action organisations;
− To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
− To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine
action in Europe, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action
projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
− To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of
implementation;
− To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor
assistance (including plans for sustainability);
− To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
− To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC
to Europe;
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of
EC-funded mine projects;
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among
mine action programmes in Europe and globally.
3. EXPECTED RESULTS
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Europe, and to
particular mine-affected countries in Europe, since 2002. It shall incorporate more detailed
assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to
illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will
aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of
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support to mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national
authorities, other donors, and UN agencies for the next years.
4. OUTPUTS
An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning
and data collection stage (late October 2007).
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and
other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.
Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and
distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to
other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.
A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels.
All reports will be in English, with the final Executive Summary translated into Spanish as
well.
All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the
European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.37

37

http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm.
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ANNEX 2 SUMMARY OF EC CONTRIBUTIONS TO MINE ACTION IN SE EUROPE 2002-2006
Country

Year

DG

Via

Dates

Instrument

Albania

2005

AIDCO?

UNDP

N/K

CARDS

Belarus

2005-2007

BiH

Delegation

HELP UDT
Sarajevo

AIDCO

ITF

Delegation

FCPA

AIDCO

ITF

Delegation

CPA RS

Delegation

ITF

Delegation

CPA RS

Delegation

FCPA

Delegation

CPA RS

2002

2003

2004
2005

AIDCO /
Delegation
ENLARG /
Delegation
ENLARG /

STOP Mines
TRIO d.o.o
SHOT d.o.o

150202150203
160202140204
271102271003
091202080104

Amount
(EUR)
2,570,000
[4,000,000]

CARDS 2001

Remarks
Project reference:
MAP/2005/108-103
Earmarked but not spent

327,939
2,163,157
1,447,821

Federal Administration of
Civil Protection

947,535

271102281003

1,100,593

110403010704
141103311004
201103201204
281204311205
260405271206
040105041006

B7-541
CARDS 2003

8,529

070105-

B7-541

38,125

B7-661

753,095

CARDS 2002

493,092

CARDS 2002

997,102

B7-541
CARDS 2003

338,103

19 02 04

Civil Protection
Administration of Republika
Srpska

1,995,079

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
VERSION 2008-12-18 | iii

Country

Year

DG
Delegation
ENLARG /
Delegation
Delegation
ENLARG /
Delegation
ENLARG /
Delegation

Croatia

Via

CEIA
FCPA
FCPA
CPA RS

2006

Delegation

ASB

2002

RELEX

ITF

2003

RELEX

ITF

2005

ENLARG

CROMAC

ENLARG

CROMAC

ENLARG

CROMAC

ENLARG

CROMAC

Delegation

CROMAC

2006

2007

Cyprus

2005

UNOPS

2006

UNOPS

2007

UNOPS

Dates

Instrument

070705
260105261105
050105050106
161205171206
081205081206
201206201208

CARDS 2003
B7-541
CARDS 2003
B7-541
CARDS 2003
B7-541
CARDS 2003
B7-541
CARDS 2003

120802120204
111204111206
261005261006
130406130407
201206200608
280607290607
170407180408
171104311205
010106311206
010107-

Amount
(EUR)

Remarks

170,884
648,507
313,279
164,881
750,000

CARDS 2002

2,000,000

CARDS 2002

2,000,000

CARDS 2003

1,010,000

CARDS 2003

990,000

CARDS 2004

1,000,000

CARDS 2004

2,319,788

CARDS 2004

1,200,000

PFF

2,500,000

PFF
PFF
PFF

1,500,000
1,000,000
4,000,000

Mine clearance
Mine clearance
Mine clearance
Mine clearance
Mine clearance
Mine clearance
Mine clearance
(In Croatia; part of a crossborder project)
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Country

Year

DG

Via

Dates

Instrument

Amount
(EUR)

Remarks

311208
Kosova

2006

OKPCC

011106201107

500,000

Project reference:
MAP/2006/123-594

Macedonia
Montenegro

Russia/Chechnya

2006-2007

[1,000,000]

Mentioned in the mine action
strategy 2005-2007 possibly
spent through UNICEF on
victim assistance

Serbia

2006-2007

[2,000,000]

Mentioned in the mine action
strategy 2005-2007

[6,000,000]

Earmarked but not spent

Ukraine

Region
SE Europe
(BiH, Croatia,
Serbia &
Montenegro and
Albania)

Year

2002

DG

Delegation
In Bosnia

Via

ITF

Dates

140403151206

Instrument

B7-661

Amount
(EUR)

2,791,320

Remarks
Support to the demining
activities in the region of
South-eastern Europe
Clearance of the Borderline
projects
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2005

2006

2007

2003

2002

2001

2004

Albania

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1944/5

ANNEX 4 ANALYSIS OF CASUALTY STATISTICS

16

4

2

3

43

19

35

30

16

13

10

8

1

0

0

0

11

14

0

0

0

0

272
6,173

Belarus

Bosnia
Croatia

1,280

55

Cyprus

23

29

24

9

5
533

Kosovo

1,083
Macedonia
1
Montenegro

4

2

Chechnya

25

45

52

Serbia

2

0

2

6

10

17

92
Ukraine

NOTES:
1. With the exception of Albania and Croatia, the remainder of the information came from Landmine Monitor 2007.
2. If a cell is blank, no data were found. If a ‘0’ is shown it indicated no casualties for that year or period.
3. The numbers indicate the total number of casualties; injured or dead.
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